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As the constraints of space and time steadily diminished n the face of rapid developments in 
the technology of communications, a bewildering variety of translocal networks have sprung 
as those involved have sought to make the most of the novel entrepreneurial opportunities 
which have consequently emerged. But whilst these ever more spatially extended  networks 
are both a cause and a consequence of the ever more globalised socio-economic rder of 
which every one of us in now a part, it is now becoming apparent that transnationalism is 
much more of a Janus-faced phenomenon than was once assumed. Given that one of the most 
overt manifestations of globalisation has been the ever more spectacular growth of 
transnational corporations, most of which were launched ‘from above’ – or in other words 
from the metropolitan heartlands of Euro-America – it is easy to see why the phenomenon 
was misread. A relatively small number of such behemoths (at least some of whom have now 
gone ‘offshore’) have colonised huge chunks of extractive, manufacturing and commercial 
activity with such great success that the only serious challengers to each such network’s 
position of global hegemony appears to be restricted to other similarly organised 
transnational corporations.  Moreover the strongly hierarchical and tightly bureaucratically 
organised enterprises largely determine the economic parameters of the world in which we 
live, in the since they help to stabilise the relatively secure environment of high-waged Euro-
America, and to open up new opportunities for labour-intensive manufacturing in populous 
but low-waged regions in Southern and Eastern Asia. Meanwhile those self-same processes 
have also created an ever more disadvantaged global periphery, most of whose inhabitants are 
still dependent on near-subsistence agriculture, but whose needs and concerns have become 
steadily more irrelevant to the calculations of the lords of the global economy.  
 
Yet although it is precisely this dimension of globalisation which the protestors at Seattle and 
elsewhere were seeking to highlight, closer inspection soon reveals that transnational 
networks can operate just as well in a counter-hegemonic as in a hegemonic format. Hence 
the emergence of these processes of networking ‘from above’ have also been accompanied by 
an explosive growth of entrepreneurial initiatives ‘from below’, with the result that many 
millions of people have been able to disentangle themselves from the marginalised positions  
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out on the periphery in which they had hitherto been confined, and to tap into the much richer 
spectrum of pportunities available in some sector of the metropolitan core. However the two 
processes are by no means mirror images of one another: transnational networks which press 
up from below are very differently structured from those which bear down from above. In the 
first place interpersonal relations within them are very differently structured, for the vast 
majority are participating members, linked by informal ties of reciprocity, rather than being 
paid employees; in consequence their principle initial asst is not so much access to financial 
capital, but to its members’ collective capacity to use their own internal resources of social, 
cultural and psychological capital to mobilise on their own behalf. 
 
That said, these processes of mobilisation ‘from below’ have had almost as far reaching 
impact on the contemporary character of the global order as have the much more heavily 
publicised processes of transnationalism from above. One of the most striking features of the 
past half century is the extent to people of non-European descent have become the prime 
movers in this sphere, such that countless millions of people have left peripheral regions in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America to seek out better opportunities in one sector or another of the 
metropolitan world. Nor is this merely a matter of migration: as entrepreneurs in transnational 
space, such migrants are invariably very active networkers who remain heavily involved with 
their kin whose domicile has remained unchanged, and who are no less keen to keep their 
overseas born offspring aboard. However such networks are sustained on a very different 
basis from the vast majority of those operating from above. Each is invariably informally 
organised, for their strength and stability is rooted not in the application of formal 
bureaucratic procedures, but in much personalised ties of reciprocal trust, which are in turn 
invariably grounded in a sense of common kinship.  
 
Nevertheless the resulting networks can be extremely varied in their structure and character, 
not least because those who are engaged in uphill struggles against socio-economic exclusion 
cannot afford to be choosy.  Indeed since their best means of doing so is by exploiting the 
opportunities available in otherwise unattractive niches, and then by using these as toeholds 
on the basis of which to inch their way yet further forward, the very alterity of their outlook, 
and a creative ability to spot opportunities which others have missed, is the secret of most 
transnational networkers’ success. But since they undertake these operations on an informal 
rather than a formal basis, they key asset on which they draw in developing their 
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contextually-oriented strategic manoeuvres is the resources of their ancestral social, cultural 
and psychological capital – whatever shape or form it may have.    
1 The dynamics of transnational networking  
Whilst it is easy enough to wax lyrical about such entrepreneurial processes, very close and 
careful questions still need to be asked about just what such cultural capital consists of, how 
it is deployed, as well as the extent of the internal contradictions which are inevitably 
embedded within it – above all because the literature on transnational migration makes it 
clear that those involved rarely, if ever, act alone. Not only do the vast majority of migrants 
move along increasingly well-worn paths, but the way in which those paths were initially 
constructed, the way in which participants continue to move along them, and the strategies of 
adaptation which they adopt at their destination is very largely rooted in the networks of 
inter-personal reciprocity in which they were involved prior to their departure. Moreover 
these networks of reciprocity are very largely organised and articulated in terms of common 
kinship. 
 
That this should be so is hardly surprising. Having set out with minimal material assets, 
neophyte entrepreneurs find that the obstacles strewn in their path are becoming steadily 
more serious. During the past few decades every metropolitan centre has progressively 
tightened its immigration controls, with the express intent of excluding those are ‘poverty 
stricken’, ‘ill-educated’, and ‘un-skilled’. Secondly even if hopeful entrepreneurs do manage 
to circumvent these outer defences – if n cessary by taking a mortgage on their future wages 
in order to buy their way through – they invariably find themselves directed straight to the 
bottom of the labour market at their destination; and even if they do manage to gain a 
legitimate right of abode, which is invariably tough task in its own right, they still face a 
steep uphill struggle against the forces of discriminatory exclusionism which are routinely 
directed at those who are visibly of alien origin.  
 
In the face of such massive disincentives, it would seem reasonable to expect that the scal  of 
these entrepreneurial inflows would at least have attenuated, even if they did not dry up 
altogether. In fact the reverse is the case: not only is there an ever growing crowd of potential 
immigrants clamouring at its gates of every metropolitan economy, but all attempts to stem 
this inflow have been nugatory. Why should this be so? Straightforward economics provides 
one part of the explanation. As the gulf in wage-rates, and hence in living standards, as 
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between the global economy’s metropolitan core and its largely non-Eur pean periphery 
becomes steadily wider, so the incentive to move from one sphere to the other becomes 
steadily stronger – and all the more so when the range of income-earning opportunities 
available at the bottom of the metropolitan labour market is much wider than many 
commentators appreciated. Supply is simply filling demand. The communicative aspects of 
globalisation also adds to the pressure. Since satellite dishes are now to be found even in the 
remotest parts of the non-metropolitan periphery, the metropolis, with all its wealth, beckons 
ever more actively. No wonder millions of adventurous young men throughout the periphery 
dream of making their way to paradise.  
 
Dreams are one thing: implementation is quite another. With that in mind it is worth noting 
that despite their immense scale, migrant flows are far from random. Rather they are 
strikingly concentrated in spatial terms, since the networks through which they are organised 
run specific towns and villages to an equ lly restricted range of destinations overseas. These 
pattern are far from static, of course. As conditions change well-est blished flows may shrink 
dramatically; but in that case they are usually replaced by movements to a new, and hitherto 
unexploited destinations. It is easy to see why this should be so. Firstly long-distance 
migration is a challenging task, and one which is fraught with danger: hence the vast majority 
of migrants aim to build on the achievements of their predecessors. Those who cannot lo k to 
predecessors for guidance are at a severe disadvantage. Secondly the entry costs in terms of 
tickets, passports has always been substantial, and those costs have steadily escalated for 
those who have no alternative but to purchase their way through immigration controls. This 
has further consequences. In the first place successful transnational migration has become 
ever more dependent on access to agents who know the ropes, and who can guide their 
customers past these increasingly substantial obstacles – at a price, of course. The media’s 
much vilified ‘snakeheads’ are but one example of those who provide this essential service. 
Secondly the severity of these difficulties can be sharply reduced if one is also in a position to 
draw on the resources of one’s extended family. 
 
With this in mind, two strategies have proved particularly useful. Since settlers in most – 
although by no means all – metropolitan destinations can eventually gain full rights as 
citizens, which in turn normally confers a right to family reunion, those who achieve that 
status can at that point call their wives, their children, and sometimes their elderly parents to 
join them overseas. Likewise marriage with a fellow villager who has gained permanent 
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rights of residence overseas can provide a very effective means of tapping into the 
opportunities of transnational entrepreneurship. Kinship is also crucial in another sense, for 
even if these avenues are unavailable, a potential migrant can invariably look to other 
members of the kinship network within which he is embedded, be they his immediate local 
family, or other kinsfolk who have already established themselves overseas to provide him 
with the loan to cover the initial entry-costs facing those wishing to enter these transnational 
spaces. Given all this, it is hardly surprising that emigrant outflows are so tightly spatially 
concentrated: emigration becomes, quite literally, a local industry.  
 
A parallel set of factors also ensures spatial concentration at the other end of the chain. With
few immediately marketable skills other than a willingness to turn their hands to whatever 
income-earning opportunities came their way, little or no command of local linguistic and 
cultural conventions, no significant financial assets, let alone the strong tendency towards 
racial and ethnic exclusionism displayed by most  members of the indigenous majority, 
newcomers inevitably looked to their kinsmen and fellow-villag rs to show them the ropes.  
Networks of mutual support grounded in such mutual unders andings swiftly emerged as 
those involved set about establishing themselves in this alien and largely hostile environment. 
However the growth of such networks was rarely an obstacle to further spatial mobility, 
especially in the early days of settlement. Since it was the network itself – rather than its 
physical location – around which all this revolved, onward movements to take advantage of 
niches which offered marginally better pay and conditions were commonplace, although once 
again in response to inf rmation transmitted through the network.  
 
Nevertheless each such nascent colony gradually developed stronger local connections. As 
the size of the settlement increased, as residential accommodation began to be bought rather 
than rented, as small businesses began to be established, and above all as wives and children 
were called over to join the pioneers, its members were able to order the greater part of their 
personal and domestic lives according to the social, moral, religious, linguistic and of course 
familial conventions which they had routinely deployed prior to their departure. These 
strategies – which did not, of course, exclude the acquisition of a growing level of familiarity 
with the cultural and linguistic conventions deployed within surrounding social order – 
proved highly adaptive. Besides permitting those who used them to construct a comfortable 
and familiar home from home within the context of an otherwise alien socio-cultural 
environment, they also provided them with a route to greater economic s curity – and indeed 
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prosperity. By dint of an immense amount of hard work, extensive mutual cooperation,  and 
an extremely frugal approach to consumption, the great majority of transnational 
entrepreneurs soon managed to reach a level of financial security which was significantly 
better than that enjoyed by members of the poorest sections of the local population amongst 
whom they had settled. To their kinsmen back home, however, that was wealth indeed.  
Nor was the end to upward mobility. Whilst achievements of most members of the first 
generation of transnational entrepreneurs were relatively modest by metropolitan standards – 
despite the exceptional few who were successful enough to have made their way into rich 
lists of millionaires – many of their locally born and bred offspring promptly took advantage 
of the opportunities available in the metropolitan educational system, and pressed their way 
yet further upwards and outwards through the employment market. Hence whilst  many of the 
first generation did not fully implement their entrepreneurial dreams, many of their children 
certainly have. In the light of such success, it hardly surprising that so many of their kinsfolk 
are still clamouring at the gates: no matter how heavy entry costs may now have become, 
they have excellent reasons for believing that if only they, too, could cross the barrier, the 
terms of their own material existence would be similarly transformed. 
 
In the midst of global economy in which capital, goods and information move ever more 
freely but where the mobility of labour is ever more tightly restricted, there can be no dispute 
that such entrepreneurial strategies have offered, and continue to offer, networkers from 
below a highly effective means of escaping from the comprehensively eripheralised position 
to which they would otherwise have been condemned. To be sure such processes have as yet 
had relatively little impact on the structure of the global socio-ec nomic order; on the other 
hand it has certainly provided a fortunate few with a very effective means of bucking the 
system. No wonder so many others are currently seeking to follow in their footsteps.  
2 The practical modalities of network construction  
Whilst it is now possible to innumerable system-bucking transnational networks whose 
parameters are broadly congruent with the model set out above, the precise structure of each 
such network, as well as the trajectories of adaptation – and of success – to which they give 
rise are almost infinitely varied. Moreover one of the principal sources of these variations is 
plain to see. Since global political and economic developments are constantly transforming 
the character of the terrain across which entrepreneurs from below are seeking to construct 
their networks, and since their very marginality leaves them far more exposed than most to 
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the impact of these changes, flexibility is essential: unless the members of each such network 
constantly monitor these changes, and devise appropriate strategic responses, all their efforts 
can easily be undermined. That said, my central concern in this chapter is not so much to 
explore the various possible responses to these external (and in that sense ‘environmental’) 
patterns of opportunity and constraint, but rather to follow up Smith and Guarnitzo’s 
suggestion that one of the most challenging analytical tasks which we currently face is  
“to determine how transnational networks work, and in that sense how principles of 
trust and solidarity are constructed across national territories as opposed to those 
which are locally based and maintained. What discourses and practices hold these 
networks in place? How are social closure and control organised across borders to 
guarantee loyalty and curtail malfeasance? How do transnational relations interact 
with local power structures, including class, caste and racial hierarchies? More 
generally, how does translocality affect the sociocultural basis supporting 
transnational relations and ties?’ (Smith and Guarnizo 1998: 26) 
Developing an adequate response to these hig ly pertinent questions is of necessity an 
extremely challenging task. Whilst they ultimate require generalised (or at least 
generalisable) answers, the data on the basis of which one might set about doing so is of 
necessity highly contingent, since the precise modalities of such processes can be expected to 
display enormous amount of variation from network to network. With this in mind I will 
deliberately reduce the number of variables we need to consider by restricting the remainder 
of my discussion to developments within just three transnational arenas – those constructed 
by migrants from Mirpur District in Azad Kashmir region of northern Pakistan, from the 
Jullundur Doab in Indian Punjab, and from Sylhet District in eastern Bangladesh in the 
aftermath of their passage to Britain.  
2.1 Kinship networks as an entrepreneurial resource  
In all three areas, as indeed as in most of the remainder of South Asia, reciprocities of kinship 
provide the most important foundation for almost all kinds of inter-personal relationship, and 
hence of network construction. And since it is around the modalities of kinship and marriage 
– whether articulated at the level of the household, the extended family or the wider birade i 
(descent group) – that almost all forms of networking take place, my central concern in the 
remainder of this chapter will be to explore the specific ways in which local variants of these 
modalities have affected (as well the way in which each has been affected by) the processes 
of global entrepreneurship in which their users have engaged.  
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At least to a first level of approximation,  the kinship systems in all three areas display many 
commonalities. Across the whole broad sweep of the Indo-Gangetic plains patrilinially 
extended families are the basic unit of property-ownership, and hence of household 
organisation. Such families are strongly corporate in character, with the result that their assets 
are viewed as the common property of all their members. Nevertheless relationships between 
them are strongly hierarchical, particularly by gender and by age: superordinates are expected 
to exercise authority over and to take responsibility for their subordinates, whilst subordinates 
are expected to respect and obey their superordinates’ instructions. Cross-gender 
relationships between young unmarried people who are other than the very closest of kin are 
regarded as unacceptable, so marriages are therefore invariably arranged – lthough as we 
shall see, the rules governing such arrangements are strikingly different i  each area. Last but 
not least, whilst each such corporate family is held together by ties of unlimited mutual 
commitment, each is in turn set within a wider network of extra-familial kinship ties of both 
descent and marriage, which are grounded in similarly structured – although rather less 
intense – feelings of mutual reciprocity.   
 
Access to the cultural capital embedded in such networks has proved to a very considerable 
asset. The strongly corporate nature of such extended families has not only meant that 
transnational entrepreneurship has collective foundations, but also that whoever is selected to 
try his hand in such an exercise can expect to receive support from its collective financial 
assets to cover his entry costs. By the same token all such departures are by definition 
‘temporary’: not only do migrants’ rights in the group’s corporate resources remain 
undiminished throughout their absence, but they are if anything reinforced, given that the 
entire group also expects to make as similar claim over the fruits of his labours whilst 
overseas. In other words the network of reciprocities between emigrants and those who stay 
behind guarantees their mutual investments in each other. 
 
Nor is that all. Since each such corporate family is in turn embedded within an even more 
extended network of biraderi reciprocities, and since these ties also provide the channels 
along which flows of chain migration develop, the final destination of those who join the 
chain is invariably one in which their kinsfolk have a ready begun to settle. Hence they are 
far from being alone: rather they have immediate access to a ready-made network from 
whose members they can ask for assistance and support as of right.  Moreover similarly 
structured linkages can also be established betwe n those whose prior connection was 
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extremely distant (as through a common friend in a distant village) or even non-existent. 
Where those involved share a common ideological outlook, they frequently construct 
networks of quasi-kinship which are similarly structured, if not quite so tightly binding, as 
those on which they are modelled. Such patterns of network-building g ow out of – whilst 
also oiling the wheels of – processes of chain migration, whilst also greatly facilitating the 
subsequent processes of settlement and colony-building. The structural consequences of all 
this are far-reaching. The arrival of each new pioneer at an opportunity-rich destination in the 
metropolitan core potentially gives rise to the emergence of escalator which reaches out to an 
equally specific location far away on the global periphery. Once set in motion such kinship-
powered escalators provide an ever-expanding stream of kinsfolk and fellow-villagers with a 
relatively effortless opportunity to move upwards from the periphery to the metropolis, 
subject only to the success of the metropolitan authorities’ efforts to impose immigration 
controls.  
2.2 Peasant values 
Before proceeding further it is also worth taking cognisance of a further vital asset on which 
such entrepreneurs, and most especially those from South Asia, routinely draw: their prior 
experience as peasant-farmers. Whilst the term peasant has strongly negative connotations 
vernacular English, the skills and assumptions in terms of which such small-s ale sub istence 
land-owning self-cultivators routinely deployed prior to their departure can also be highly 
adaptive in metropolitan contexts. Once again it is not difficult to see why. Over and above a 
taken for granted awareness of the benefits that can accrue from colletiv  activity – as, for 
example, in the extended family – peasant farmers are invariably strongly committed to self-
sufficiency. Bitter experience has long since taught them that outsiders are not to be trusted, 
especially when they are the tax-gathering agents of rapacious landlords and rulers: peasants 
therefore invariably place an extremely high premium on independence and autonomy.  In the 
context of a working assumption that outsiders will never have anything but their own 
exploitative interests to heart, peasants routinely mistrust everyone but their own immediate 
kin. But even in that context – where reciprocity is taken for granted – peasants normally 
proceed in as frugal a manner as possible: dependency is avoided like the plague.  
 
Peasant farming demands an intense level of physical commitment in a whole series of self-
sufficient projects which are carefully, confidently and entrepreneurially organised. Long 
term financial planning is taken for granted, for peasants farmers do not depend on weekly 
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wage packets, and still less on the daily dole that they hand out to the landless labourers (who 
are in their view the epitome of fecklessness) whom they parsimoniously engage. Hence their 
economic horizon stretches not just from harvest to harvest, but from generation to 
generation. Children offer an irreplaceable source of long-term security. A commitment to 
frugality and long-term asset management is therefore deeply embedded in their everyday 
lifestyles.  
 
But although the greater part of the urban proletariat in the metropolitan world may well be of 
peasant ancestry, such values stand sharply at odds with the those into which their 
descendants have subsequently been socialised. A world of weekly wage packets, of social 
security, and above all access to cheap credit which enables a plethora of consumer products 
to be enjoyed long before the money to pay for them has actually been earned, is entirely 
alien to the peasant experience. Moreover the foolishness of those who take such a world for 
granted seems self evident. Isn’t it obvious, ask the peasants, that the jobs on which this 
whole structure depends might be just as vulnerable as is next year’s harvest is to an 
unexpected drought? Can’t they see that living in hock places necessarily places them at the 
mercy of loan sharks? And that children are much better viewed as an investment than a 
financial burden? Yet despite the comprehensive lack of fit between peasant values and those 
which underpin contemporary consumer capitalism, this certainly does not handicap those 
who have recently arrived from the rural periphery. Quite the contrary. Not only do they take 
it for granted that will have to look after themselves, but they also have access to a wide 
range of strategies by means of which to do so. So it is that although they invariably have 
little alternative but to find an initial toehold with the local underclass, they nevertheless 
routinely display a remarkable ability to embark not just to survive in, but begin to generate a 
surplus from, their engagement with conditions normally associated with severe poverty and 
gross exploitation.  
2.3 Savings and capital accumulation 
How can that be? Since they are used to working for themselves, few migrants of peasant 
origin are seriously disturbed by the prospect of working a twelve hour day, seven days a 
week – at least for a short period. No-one has any intention of doing so for ever. Rather such 
a burst of activity is invariably viewed as a means to an end: to improve the long-term socio-
economic prospects of oneself and one’s family. In such circumstances it also makes sense to 
fall back on a basic rural diet (of lentils and home-baked bread in South Asian contexts), so 
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dramatically reducing one’s living expenses. Likewise housing and even beds can be shared, 
especially if one set of occupants works on the night shift and the other on days. Of course 
such behaviour is in no sense a ormal: no-one would dream of adopting such barren 
lifestyles on a routine basis. Rather it is the outcome of a comprehensive commitment to 
deferred gratification. Hence their ultimate objective either to return to the peace and luxury 
of their own home village, weighed down with their fruits of their labour elsewhere, or of 
pressing their way upwards and outwards into a less demanding and more comfortable niche 
in the metropolis – or better still, of both. Those who adopt such a strategic outlook clearly 
have a great deal going for them. Though the level of success achieved varies a great deal 
between individuals in any given network, and even more so as between differently 
constituted networks, those involved invariably display much higher levels of mobility than 
their immediate rivals in the labour market: members of the systematically demoralised 
indigenous proletariat who fill its lower reaches.  
 
Even so, their success is dependent on much more than mere frugality. However much they 
may be cultivators at heart, most peasants are prepared to engage in almost any income-
generating activity. Waged work may indeed be an option, but even so most much prefer to 
work for themselves. Hence South Asian of all backgrounds invariably seek to supplement 
their wages by developing a ‘side-busin ss’; and should these prove successful, as they very 
often do, they may well switch over entirely to self-empl yment. In so doing routinely act as 
bricoleurs, constantly scouring their immediate environment for opportunities, and skilfully 
exploiting all those niches in which the entry costs are low, and where the potential for profit 
is largely a function of the scale of effort and ingenuity which the entrepreneur – tog the  
with all the other members of his extended family – is ble to deploy. Hence the favoured 
niches into which South Asian entrepreneurs have begun to move in substantial numbers 
include taxi-driving, take-aways, market stalls, corner shops, clothing manufacture, house-
renovation, car-repair workshops and so forth. In doing so they are beginning to put the local 
waged for unskilled waged labour firmly behind.  
 
However a further characteristic of those of peasant background are their ambitions – if not, 
for themselves, then certainly for their children. In sharp contrast to the well tamed members 
of long-established urban industrial proletariats, peasants have never been socialised to 
failure. They know all about social exclusion, of course: larger landlords, merchants and 
agents of the state have always treated them with disdain. But whilst they harbour an acute 
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sense of the inherent rapaciousness of all those fortunate enough to have clambered into such 
positions, they also take the view that that if only their sons could gain access to education, 
and could be persuaded to work hard enough at their books, they too could find their way to 
the top of the pile. Out on the periphery, the prospect of ulling this off is remote: educational 
services are ill-developed in the countryside, whilst those schools which are well enough 
staffed to provide an escalator to the top are beyond both the spatial and the financial reach of 
mere peasant farmers. Conditions n the metropolis could not be more different. State 
education of a reasonable quality is universally available, and the obstacles to rapid upward 
educational mobility are clearly very much less. Hence peasant migrants invariably go to 
great lengths to press their children to take advantage of opportunities from which they 
themselves were excluded. 
2.4 Status competition 
In South Asian contexts status-competition strongly reinforces this drive for upward mobility. 
Although every corporate family within a give  biraderi normally views itself as being of 
equal worth to – and hence as having as social status which is principle no different from – 
that all of its other members, most such biraderis are wracked by vigorous processes of 
internal status competition. The roots of this paradox are easy enough to explain. Precisely 
because each corporate family is strongly committed to maintaining itself in a condition of 
non-dependency, and to protecting its members reputation men and women of honour, each is 
also constantly on guard against the prospect that their nominally equal kin might steal a 
march on them either by becoming dramatically more wealthy, or by besmirching their 
honour in some way. To those who feel that their social standing has thus been compromised,  
two main options are open. Either to show that the their rival’s to personal honour are 
specious, or to find some alternative route to wealth – so allowing them to catch up with, and 
better still to surpass, their rivals’ achievements. Processes can hav  a far reaching impact on 
the dynamics of transnational entrepreneurship. 
 
In the first place the initial pioneers of such migratory exercises are invariably drawn from 
corporate families who feel they have fallen behind their neighbours in material terms, but 
whose membership contains a superfluity of relatively inactive young adult males. When the 
remainder of the group’s members can cultivate it landholdings with ease, sending off at least 
one of its otherwise under-employed young man to seek his fortune in the global labour 
market is clearly an attractive option. However the rationale behind such a move is far more 
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complex than a simple ‘escape from poverty’. A better view is that the family has chosen to 
redeploy some of its surplus labour in a cash-rich environment, to invest some of its 
accumulated savings in sending him there, in the confident expectation that he will 
subsequently be able to substantially reinforce the family’s capital resources, which can then 
be profitably and productively invested in projects such as buying additional agricultural 
land, rebuilding the house in which the family lives, arranging prestigious marriages for its as 
yet unmarried daughters – so thereby radically enhancing the whole family’s social standing.  
 
Yet although transnational activity may provide a new remedy for those who had temporarily 
fallen behind, its knock- n effects were much less unprecedented. As those families which 
had previously been overshadowed press their way back into the sunlight, so those who had
previously enjoyed that position found themselves slipping back into the shade. Hence in 
biraderi after biraderi more and more families began seriously to consider the benefits of 
transnational entrepreneurship, if only catch up with the upstarts who had the emerity to seek 
to outshine them. Processes of this kind soon became self-sustaining. Provided that the 
barriers of immigration control could be successfully circumnavigated, virtually every family 
in many of the villages from which the earliest pione rs were drawn has by now gone 
transnational.  
3 The internal  dynamics of transnational networks 
Transnational spaces can be occupied in a wide variety of different ways. At the outset, most 
South Asian peasants who set off overseas simply saw themselves as adding a long-distance 
spatial dimension to long-established forms of local practice. Temporary waged employment 
was not in itself a novel phenomenon: all that was new was the distance travelled. Nor was 
their destination significant in its own right. To be sure urban Britain was viewed as a honey-
pot in material terms, for it allowed them to earn and save with unparalleled swiftness, but 
beyond that most of the early sojourners regarded it as a social and cultural no-man’s land. 
Hence even if their physical absence proved to be relatively lengthy, they still regarded 
themselves as full members of their corporate families back in South Asia. It follows that as 
far as they themselves were concerned, participation in the global labour market was but a 
passing phase, since their objective in doing so was to add to their family’s local esources of 
capital and prestige.  
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3.1 Remittances and the organisation of transnational space 
In the longer run members of the networks in which they were caught up began to occupy 
transnational space on a very different basis, especially when their presence overseas turned 
out to be a much more long-term enterprise than the earlier pioneers had ever envisaged. That 
said, it is also worth noting that almost all of those who reached adulthood at the home base 
before moving overseas – nd who were therefore thoroughly socialised into the values and 
expectations of the local social order – retained a significant part of this mindset, even though 
their overseas born and raised offspring had moved on elsewhere. Hence whilst those born 
overseas have largely lost interest in the status-games being played out in their villages of 
origin, their elderly parents and grandparents frequently continue to devote a great deal of 
energy – and as much as the family’s capital resources as they can lay their hands on – nto 
building grand houses and investing in agricultural land back in the arena which they still 
consider to be their real home. So it is that as long as members of that generation are still 
alive – or in other words for at least half a century after mass migration began – Britain’s 
South Asian transnational networks have been (and no doubt will continue to be) conduits for 
the transfer of a substantial volume of capital back to by now well-established settlers 
villages of origin.  
 
That said, the scale and direction of asset-tran fers within any given transnational network 
normally varies very considerably over time. The scale of remittances normally rises to a 
peak in the immediate aftermth of emigration, for once the entry-cost of getting overseas has 
been paid off, most sojourners send the greater part of their savings back home at the earliest 
possible opportunity. However once emigrants are joined by their wives and children, as 
almost always eventually occurs, the scale of remittances drops sharply: the living expenses 
associated with family life overseas are inevitably very much greater than those incurred by 
lone males committed to comprehensively deferred gratification, with the result that ir 
capacity to save drops sharply. Remittances – whi h in this context frequently take the form 
of consumer goods rather than cash – are much more a symbolic indication of the absentees’ 
on-going commitment to their extended family than a serious tr n fer of capital assets. Whilst 
this pattern may continue for many years, it is by no means the end of the matter. Once such 
settlers’ overseas born children have reached adulthood and hence begun to generate incomes 
of their own, elderly retirees with fewer responsibilities can begin to revert to their former 
passions. As they begin to play the status game back home much more actively once again, so 
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the scale of remittances frequently begin to rise sharply once again, and is very often 
associated with a renewed construction boom back home.  
 
However such retirees’ booms also have a limited lifespan: since such retirees overseas-born 
children rarely share their parents’ passion for the acquisition of real estate back home, most 
quietly sell the greater part of their parents’ carefully acquired holdings after their deaths, and 
remit the greater part of the proceeds back to the universe which they themselves inhabit. 
3.2 Marriage, migration and the developmental cycle in domestic groups 
As Edmund Leach long ago emphasised in his classic analysis, every domestic group follows 
its own distinctive processual trajectory, whose precise course is determined on the on the 
one hand by the unpredictable incidence of life events such birth and death, and on the other 
by its members decisions’ with respect residence, marriage, household formation and so 
forth. Those decisions are in turn governed by group members’ conventional expectations 
about the way in which interpersonal relations within the household should be organised, and 
further conditioned by its members’ efforts to manoeuvre their way to their own advantage 
through the obstacles and opportunities facing them in their immediate environmental 
context.  
 
Once one takes all this aboard, the simplified analytical schema which I have presented so far 
is rendered a great deal more complex, above all because one has to take much more careful 
cognisance of the consequences of the specific conventions of kinship, household formation 
and above all of marriage in terms of which network members operate. Once this is borne in 
mind, it soon becomes clear that what might otherwise appear to be some thoroughly arcane 
differences in patterns of household organisation, and most especially in rules and 
conventions governing choices f marriage partners have had a far-reaching impact on the 
way in which the transnational networks established by peasant migrants from Mirpur, 
Jullundur and Sylhet have developed over time, and indeed over the way in which they 
currently operate.  
3.2.1 Female seclusion and its consequences  
One striking common feature of migration from all three areas is that the pioneers were 
exclusively males. Although the great majority were married, their wives and children 
remained resident in the extended household headed by the migrant’s parents. This can be 
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glossed in a number of ways. In the first place it reflected the strength of the north Indian 
view that in no circumstances should honourable women strike out into extra-domestic aren s 
by themselves – in sharp contrast to Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Philippines, where an 
exceptionally high proportion of transnational entrepreneurs are women. Secondly the elders 
took the view that if those who left were unencumbered by domestic responsibilities whilst 
also being bound by ties of affection and loyalty to their wives and children, they would find 
themselves under pressure both to maximise their savings, and to bring them back home at 
the earliest opportunity. This also reflected the elders’ concern to sustain the corporate u ity 
of the extended family: as long as their daughter-in-law and her children were still living with 
them, they had a backstop against the prospect that their son might be seduced by the 
glamour of foreign ways, forget his corporate obligations, squander his savings – or worse 
still, fail ever to return home at all.  
 
Be that as it may, virtually all the Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi men who made the 
passage to Britain did eventually bring their wives and children to join them. The forces that 
eventually impelled them to do so are not hard to discern. Lone male residence in Britain was 
hard going: it turned all the pleasures and comforts of domesticity into a distant dream, but 
even when they did return home on lengthy furloughs – those who adopted a strategy of inter-
continental commuting regularly did – the discovery that their children had forgotten their 
father’s very appearance during his absence was disturbing in the extreme. As the years 
passed, so the attractions of domestic reunion in Britain became stronger and stronger. What 
is very striking, however, is although the original pioneers from all three areas arrived in 
Britain at much the same time, there were immense variations in the speed at which the 
process of domestic reunion took place. 
 
The Jullunduris, the majority of whom are Jat Sikh, were by far the quickest to do so: most of 
the male pioneers brought their wives and children to join them between two and four years 
after first arriving in Britain. The Mirpuris took good deal longer, p rt y by choice, and partly 
because Britain’s has begun to interpret its immigration rules much more stringently by the 
time they got around to preparing the necessary application, thus introducing a further 
element of delay. Anything between five and twenty years might pass before Mirpuri settlers 
were finally joined by their wives and children. Finally the Sylhetis from Bangladesh 
characteristically took even longer still, so much so that when they did finally make the move 
a significant number of men who had by now reached late middle age took the opportunity to 
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set the wives to whom they had long been married to one side, and instead imported a new 
and very much younger partner.  
 
Just what it was the precipitated these huge differences? The rules of female seclusion, 
purdah, was undoubtedly a very significant factor, for these rules were interpreted in 
strikingly different ways in each of the three areas with which we are concerned.  Whilst Sikh 
women in Jullundur are expected to behave with extreme modesty and circumspection in the 
company of their husband’s older male kin, the rules of modesty impose few restrictions on 
their physical mobility: hence women routinely set off for the market, and go to school and 
college, by themselves. In both Mirpur and Sylhet, however, that is still regarded as quite 
scandalous. To be sure such women may move with relative freedom between immediately 
neighbouring households, especially if – as is most usually the case – th y are inhabited by 
her immediate kinsfolk; however they can only step further afield if fully veiled, as well as 
being accompanied by a male chaperone. Given these differences, it is easy to see that a 
passage to Britain would be regarded as a much more alarming – and challenging – exercise 
when viewed from a Mirpuri or Sylheti rather than a Jullunduri perspective.  
3.2.2 Marriage rules and their consequences 
Yet although attitudes to purdah undoubtedly had a significant impact on decisions with 
respect to family reunion, these were by no means the principal cause of the radical 
differences in the speed with which that took place. Instead variations in each group’s 
characteristic domestic developmental cycles – which are in turn largely grounded in 
different conventions about who may, and may not, be chosen as a marriage partner, turn out 
to have a far greater causal impact.  
 
Let us begin with the marriage rules deployed by Jullunduri Sikhs (and Hindus, for that 
matter). Whilst it routinely expected that all marriages should be arranged between families 
belonging to the same caste, these rules of endogamy are also accompanied by a parallel set 
of exogamous restrictions, such that one’s partner may not be chosen from one’s own 
patrilineal descent group (got), nor from that of one’s mother, one’s father’s mother or one’s 
mother’s mother. The central consequences of these rules is that every marriage – which is 
revealingly termed a riste, a relationship – must in effect be contracted with strangers; whilst 
they must of course be members of the same caste, they may only be arranged between 
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families which have no prior agnatic or affinal tied. This has a far reaching impact on the 
micro-politics of the extended family. 
 
In the first place as sons and daughters reach marriageable age, families have no specific 
prior obligations with respect to accepting or making offers of riste: since each affinal linkage 
is established afresh, strategic choices are largely governed by whatever long-term interests 
the family perceives as being most urgent. Secondly newly-married brides cannot expect to 
find any immediate allies amongst the other womenfolk in the extended household: the 
absolutely critical relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law has therefore 
always to be negotiated from scratch. Thirdly, and consequently, ev n those in-marrying 
brides who do establish a working relationship with their mothers-in-law s ill have a strong 
incentive to engineer a partial ‘peeling-off’ of their conjugal partnership within the wider 
structure of the extended family, which is best achieved when she and her husband (and of 
course their children) establish a more or less autonomous domestic unit of their own. Last 
but by no means least, the on-going strength of in-marrying women’s individualised linkages 
with their natal biraderis, and most particularly with their brothers, is always a powerful 
potential source of refuge and assistance should women run into difficulties either with their 
husbands or their in-laws. 
 
In nearby Mirpur, however, marriage rules take a very different turn. Although the basic 
conventions of family and kinship within which they operate are very similar to those 
deployed by Hindu and Sikh Jullunduris, the Mirpuris, as Muslims, add a crucial extra twist. 
The complex rules of exogamy outlined above have no place in their world, and instead the 
inner limits as to whom they may or not marry are governed solely by the rules of incest. 
Given that these are closely congruent with those set out in Leviticus, there are no restrictions 
on marriages between cousins (whether cross or parallel), as is equally the case throughout 
the the Islamic world. However in Mirpur, as in much of the rest of northern Pakistan, this is 
taken one step further: close-kin marriage is actively preferred. My own observations suggest 
that at least 60% of all Mirpuri marriages are contracted between first cousins, and a very 
substantial proportion of the remainder are contracted between slightly more distant kin.  
 
Just how is this exceedingly high frequency best accounted for? Whilst the basic rule  within 
which they operate are derived from the qur’an and hadith, this active preference for close 
kin marriage is dervived from a more locally specific aspect of their kinship system: the 
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expectation that brothers and sisters have rights of first refusal with respect to the rist  of 
their siblings’ children. It is worth noting that this is rarely the determinant of exactly who 
will marry whom. Since the great majority of sibling groups are large, and such rist s c  a  
well be established with offspring of the mother’s as the father’s sibling group, there is 
normally a good deal of choice. Indeed as we shall see, this often precipitates fierce 
squabbles over whether it is to be the husband’s or the wife’s sibling group which is to be 
favoured with the available riste. Even so, these conventions impose a crucial constraint on 
marriage choice, particularly in transnational contexts. Even if a family places most of its 
available ristes with non-kin for very good reasons – whether to cement a business or 
political deal of some sort, or simply because their own children have other priorities – the 
reminder of their kindred will almost certainly feel short-changed, since the mutual obligation 
which should have governed relationships between them have been overlooked. That said, it 
is also worth emphasising that many Mirpuris take the view that cousin marriage is an 
intrinsically advantageous strategy, since it is not only a highly effective means of reinforcing 
biraderi solidarity, but also of ensuring that daugh ers will not be mistreated by their in-laws.  
 
High levels of close kin marriage have a far-r aching impact on patterns of inter-personal 
relationship within each domestic group. Perhaps the most significant difference between 
Mirpur and Jullundur is that although brides are still symbolically transferred from their natal 
to their in-law’s extended family at marriage – f only because the rituals themselves are 
constructed in such a way as to emphasise that very point – onl a very small minority of 
brides are strangers to their affines: on the contrary the bride’s mother-in-law is very 
frequently her aunt. Precisely because they are not str ngers to one another,  the level of 
female solidarity within Mirpuri households – although far from being wholly untrammelled 
– tends to be a great deal higher than amongst the Jullunduris. Further considerations 
reinforce the same point. In a Jullunduri context, all the women married into any given 
village will have been drawn in from a huge penumbra of neighbouring villages lying 
anything between one to ten miles away, with the result that each conjugal pair (together with 
their offspring) have access to their own individuating network of affinal ties linking them to 
the wife’s peke (her natal village). This not only further undermines the prospects for 
solidarity between resident wives, but also provides conjugal couples with an important 
source of external assistance should they wish to claim greater autonomy within the 
agnatically extended family.  
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The Mirpuri picture is quite different. Whilst the rules of purdahmay severely restrict 
women’s spatial mobility, the much smaller geographical spread of marital ties means that 
many of the women living in the immediate neighbourhood – and indeed her own immediate 
in-laws – will be her kin. Much follows from this. Locked as they are into exceptionally tight-
knit kinship networks, so much so that most people are related to each other several times 
over, peeling away their husbands away from their agnatic loyalties is a much less urgent 
priority for Mirpuri wives than it is for their Jullunduri counterparts. Secondly, and just as 
importantly, because women’s own kinship networks are much less seriously disturbed by 
marriage than they are in Jullundur, let alone the fact tha  the best way of advancing their 
own interests is through the strategic manipulation of their offspring’s riste, most women find 
themselves drawn much more firmly into these already much more highly in-turn d networks 
than is normally the case amongst the Sikhs and Hindus of Jullundur.  
 
The situation in Sylhet differs yet again, and for a whole variety of reasons. Once again the 
basic structure of the corporate extended family in Sylhet is very similar to that found 
elsewhere, but in their case unilineal descent groups (known as gushtirather than biraderi) 
are considerably shallower, as well as being much less tightly organised. As a result 
households and groups of households (g r and bari) are not only rather more autonomous, 
but given the uncertainties arising in Bengal’s extremely riverine environment, can also 
experience radical changes in socio-ec nomic status over relatively short periods of time. 
Agnatic networks therefore tend to be much less all-embracing, as well as much less socially 
and spatially far-reaching than they are in either Mirpur or Jullundur. There are also 
significant difference in marriage patterns. Whilst the Sylhetis, as Muslims, have no objection 
to cousin marriage, such unions are much less frequent in Sylhet than they are in Mirpur. 
Instead marriages are primarily arranged on a strategic basis (much as in Jullundur, but 
without the constraints imposed by gotra endogamy), in the expectation that the affinal 
alliances so constructed will enable the family to advance its material interests, and above all 
its status.  
 
Once again this has far-re ching implications for patterns of inter-personal relationships 
within the household and extended family. Because rural settlements in Sylhet are dispersed 
across an endless expanse of padi fields, nucleated villages of any size are extremely rare: 
most residential aggregations contain ten households or less. Given the rules of purdah,the 
women of each bari not only live in a condition of relative isolation, but also tend to find 
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themselves much more vulnerable to male exploitation than do their counterparts in 
Jullundur. The reasons for this are not hard to identify: over and above the impact of purdah 
and the smallness of each bari, high rates of exogamy not only undermine women’s ability to 
draw on their resources of their own kindred just as seriously as they do in Jullundur, but in 
so doing also preclude the development of the tight-knit ‘underground’ kinship networks 
from which many Mirpuri women derive such power. With so little leverage over their 
husbands’ behaviour, it follows that Sylheti women’s most effective – and in some cases their 
only – route to power and influence is through their offspring, and above all through their 
sons.  
3.2.3 Migration and family reunion  
With the advantage of hindsight, it is easy to see why the overseas bridgeheads constructed 
by the early transnational pioneers proved to be far more permanent  than anyone responsible 
for establishing them ever imagined: the material advantages to which they gave access were 
just too great for it to make any sense to close them down. Nevertheless the process of 
exploiting those advantages brought its own costs – most notably those associated with 
sojourners’ physical separation from  their wives and children. In the face of all this a shift in 
policy was ultimately almost inevitable, and in the light of what we have seen of the internal 
dynamics of their extended families, it is hardly surprising that the Jullunduris were the first 
to make the decisive break. In addition to a growing awareness of the much higher standard 
of living and range of opportunities which they could ultimately expect to enjoy if they were 
to construct a more or less permanent base for themselves in Britain, the establishment of 
more or less autonomous c njugal households within the overarching context of a corporate 
extended family was broadly congruent with expected developments in a Jullunduri context. 
Not only were wives only to willing to gain greater autonomy from their mothers-in-law, but 
such a partial peeling-away of a conjugal couple and their offspring was by no means unusual 
– even if doing so at a distance of five thousand miles was wholly unprecedented. That said, 
most emigrants also went out of their way to means of signalling that their objective in so 
doing was not to undermine the corporate unity of the extended family, but rather a strategic 
move to enhance it.  
 
Sons were therefore careful to make substantial remittances before taking their wives and 
children abroad, and to continue to make it quite clear that they were still strongly committed 
to the family’s corporate development despite their physical absence overseas. Those claims 
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had considerable substance. As a result of being plugged into a transnational network, those 
who stayed back home not only gained access to a continuous inflow of remittances and 
prestigious consumer goods, but also to a realistic prospect that either they themselves – or 
failing that their offspring – could also move abroad, as and when it seemed appropriate to do 
so. Most Jullunduri families therefore found that transnational extensions of their network 
was a thoroughly beneficial development: a comprehensive commitment to mutual 
reciprocity could still be sustained even when one of the family’s conjugal units m ved more 
or less permanently overseas.  basis. In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that most 
overseas entrepreneurs took up the option of family reunion as soon as they found it 
strategically convenient to do so. 
 
Mirpuri migrants played the game very differently. Although they set off for Britain at much 
the same time as their Jullunduri counterparts, and with much the same objectives, the great 
majority stayed locked in the remittance maximizing phase for much very much longer: ten to 
fifteen years frequently elapsed before they finally brought their wives and children to join 
them. It was not that the Mirpuris were any less keen to exploit the opportunities associated 
with transnational entrepreneurship, but rather that they set about doing so in a rather 
different way. For them, family reunion proved to be a much less urgent priority. Not only 
were they even more wary than their Jullunduri counterparts about exposing their wives and 
children to what they perceived as the comprehensive amorality of the British cultural order, 
but their wives were also a good deal less eager to make the passage to Britain – unless they 
received unwelcome news suggesting that an errant husband got himself over-involved with 
an English girlfriend. At that poin the restrictions of purdah were frequently ignored: wives 
set out in person sort the matter out.  
 
Nevertheless long-term emigrants sorely missed all the comforts of home, and soon devised a 
solution to the problem: transnational commuting. In the course of collecting life-histories I 
encountered case after case of men who had first arrived in Britain ten, fifteen or twenty 
years previously, but who had in fact spent little more than half the intervening period in 
Britain. In between they had taken a whole series of more or less extended furloughs back 
home. For them, Britain became a location where money was earned but all gratification was 
deferred, so allowing them to enjoy the fruits of their labour – and to invest in both land and 
housing – on each of their periodic returns. Just as in Jullundur, their manifest success 
encouraged many others to follow in their footsteps. Migrants therefore went out of their way 
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to assist their a wide range of kinsmen, friends and fellow villagers to make their way to 
Britain. Indeed that pattern soon became so well entrenched that as soon as migrants’ sons 
were old enough to be employable, their fathers began to take them along on their foraging 
trips to Britain. Such a strategy became particularly appealing when it became clear that a 
selective utilisation of their right to family reunion was an extremely convenient means of 
evading the increasingly stringent controls on labour migration.  
From the Mirpuri perspective the logic of this strategy was quite clear. Howeverunattractiv  
Britain might be as a site for permanent domestic residence, the cash income to which they 
could gain access by working in its textile industry was far more plentiful, as well as far more 
reliable, than anything they could hope to extract from heir ields. In the absence of their 
wives and children, men could be expected to work long hours whilst spending little, and so 
to maximise their savings; and the more men a birad ri could rotate to Britain, the larger and 
more secure the remittance inflow they would generate.  
 
At this stage Jullunduri and Mirpuri entrepreneurs were choosing to occupy transnational 
space on a very different basis. Whilst the Jullunduris moved swiftly towards the 
establishment of domestically complete outliers, which in turn provided the foundation for 
the construction of thriving British-based ethnic colonies, the Mirpuris extend their arenas for 
meaningful social interaction beyond their home base. Transnational commuting provided 
them with a means of browsing the opportunities they had identified in the British sector of 
the transnational labour market without – or so they thought – becoming over-committed to 
it. 
 
In the absence of any intervening factors, it is an open question as to how long that pattern 
would have continued to be sustainable. But that was not to be: all manner of further 
contingencies gradually undermined the viability of this strategy. The first of these was 
thoroughly paradoxical: an effort by the British authorities to close off the chink in the 
immigration rules which Mirpuris had begun to exploit with increasing frequency. Noting 
that they were utilising their rights to family reunion by bringing their sons (and very often 
their nephews posing as their sons) to Britain one by one shortly before t ey reached school 
leaving age, so enabling them to enter the labour market a few months later, the authorities 
hit on what they evidently considered to be a cunning ploy: to require those making use of 
this right to bring their entire family over to Britain in one go, rather than doing so in 
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selective dribs and drabs. But the authorities’ attempt to plug a gap turned out, in the event, to 
open a flood-gate.  
 
In the first place an increasing number of Mirpuri sojourners began to take the authorities’ 
demand at face value, and to bring their entire families over to Britain. However they had 
also carefully scrutinised the regulations, and noted that they did not require their wives and 
daughters to take up permanent residence in the UK. So it was that after a brief visit, many of 
their wives and daughters set off back to Mirpur, leaving all the male members of the family 
in Britain. However the very arrival of women – albeit on a temporary basis – lso broke the 
mould. From the late 1970s onwards an ever risig number of Mirpuri sojourners began to 
adopt a similar strategy to their Jullunduri counterparts, and to establish fully fledged 
domestic units in Britain. Thereafter family reunion soon became quite unexceptional, and 
Britain’s Mirpuri population to swell exponentially, much to the authorities’ alarm. 
 
Nevertheless it would be idle to suggest this was the sole reason for the Mirpuris’ change of 
strategy. Other factors included the interpersonal tensions which had begun to build up within 
many families as  result of transnational commuters’ lengthy periods of absence, together 
with the ever-increasing degree to which Mirpur’s local economy had grown dependent on 
the remittance inflow produced by these transnational connections. The agricultural and 
commercial foundations of Mirpur’s economy was much weaker than that of Jullundur, and 
productive industry was virtually absent. In no sense, therefore, did remittances add gilt to the 
gingerbread: rather they generated a vast inflationary bubble of apparent prosperity of which 
it was only possible to take full advantage by active participation in transnational networks. 
At the same time Britain’s economy was also changing. Although an ever increasing number 
of Mirpuri transcontinental commuters were being drawn i to Britain’s textile and heavy 
engineering industries during the course of the 1970’s, most of these enterprises – which 
were heavily dependent on cheap labour to keep their near-obsolesc nt machinery in 
operation – were tottering towards their final collapse. But the crunch could not be avoided. 
As recession struck at the end of the decade, mill after mill closed down, and transcontinental 
commuters found that the jobs to which they had confidently expected to return after 
completing their furlough were no longer available. Nor did staying put prove to much of an 
alternative. Even those who did hang onto their jobs soon began to find themselves being 
made redundant – with little or no prospect of finding alternative employment. Transnational 
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commuting, dependant as it was on sojourners’ ability to take lengthy furloughs, had ceased  
to be a viable strategy. 
 
By the time this occurred, a substantial number of Mirpuris had in fact brought over their 
wives and children to join them on a permanent basis. However in the face of these additional 
adversities, virtually all the remainder now decided that the time had come to do the same. 
Economic recession in Britain might be causing all sorts of setbacks, but nevertheless the 
resources on which they were in a position t  call in Britain, most particularly in terms of 
access of welfare services, were far superior to anything available in rural Mirpur: pressing 
onwards into the transnational arena offered most British-based Mirpuris a much more 
attractive set of options than did drawing in their horns and returning home. There were only 
two categories of people to whom this did not apply. Firstly elderly men who had reached 
pensionable age, and whose sterling-based state pension offered them – once exchanged for 
rupees – a secure and substantial income-flow for the remainder of their lives; and secondly 
younger men who had accumulated substantial savings, and felt that this was an opportune 
moment to implement their long standing dream of a permanent returning to theirhome base.    
 
Sadly, that rarely proved to be a viable option. As most such returnees soon discovered, it 
was very much easier to spend money back home in Mirpur than it was to make it. In sharp 
contrast to Jullundur, where remittances have added gilt to the gingerbread of a thriving local 
economy, the paucity of Mirpur’s productive base is such that the scale of local economic 
activity is now almost entirely a function of the inflow of remittances. Hence those who 
sought refuge from recession-hit Britain by returning to Mirpur in the early nineteen eighties 
could not have chosen a worse time to try to implement their long-standing dreams, since the 
very phenomenon from which they were seeking to escape was wreaking even more serious 
havoc back home. Hence most of the hopeful returnees soon became deeply frustrated by 
their inability to identify any kind of profitable activity in which to invest. As they watched 
their accumulated savings drain away at an alarming rate, most decided that they had little 
alternative but to try their luck in Britain once again.  
 
Last but not least, we must also consider the way in which migrants from Sylhet eventually 
adopted a similar change in strategy. As we saw earlier, the Sylhetis not only interpret the 
rules of purdah as strictly as do the Mirpuris, but gender inequalities within the household are 
such that Sylheti women have even less bargaining power than do their Mirpuri counterparts. 
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In such circumstances it should come as no surprise that whilst Sylheti peasants have an 
exceptionally long history of entrepreneurial involvement in the transnational labour market, 
they were the last to abandon the strategy of transnational commuting. Hence women of 
Sylheti peasant origin were rarely to be seen in Britain until the early ine e n eighties. But 
although family reunion has proceeded apace since then, the material circumstances within 
which this occurred were far more adverse than those experienced by the other two groups. 
With hindsight, the Jullunduris took the plunge at by far he most opportune moment. 
Throughout the nineteen fifties, sixties and early seventies there was an almost unlimited 
demand for semi-sk lled industrial workers, and housing in inner-city ar as could be bought 
very cheaply; reunited households were still at an early stage in their developmental cycle, 
most couples were still young, and rarely had more than one or two children; and since 
Jullunduri women had no compunction about going out to work, most households could rely 
on two wage-packets. Given their overall commitment to frugality, most Jullunduris soon 
reached a position of economic security, such that they were able to offer positive assistance 
to those of their kinsfolk who found their way to Britain, and to provide a significant degree 
of support to those who had stayed back home.  
 
The Mirpuris found the going considerably tougher. Firstly they had, over the years, sent a 
much higher proportion of their accumulated earnings back home, if only because of their 
delay in implementing family reunion. Secondly the economic circumstances in which they 
did so were far more adverse: the very industrial sector which had enabled them to act as 
transnational commuters was by then in terminal decline, and soon collapsed completely. 
Thirdly their families had by then entered a much later stage in their developmental cycle, 
and hence contained many more children. Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly of all, their 
assumption that it was quite inappropriate for respectable women to take employment outside 
the household meant that dual income households were exceedingly rare: indeed levels of 
unemployment were so high that a large proportion relied solely on social security benefits. 
 
That said, most Sylheti households found the going tougher still. Although Sylheti ex-seamen 
established their first residential bridgeheads in the docklands of East London as long ago as 
the nineteen thirties, from which many began to break out into the catering trade, firstly as 
kitchen staff and then as restaurateurs in their ow  right, when the post-war industrial boom 
took off a high proportion of Sylheti newcomers followed the Mirpuris into the mills of 
England’s northern industrial cities. But whilst the great majority of their Mirpuri 
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counterparts had begun to reunite their famili s – and were therefore tied down to the houses 
which they had recently bought – by the time that severe recession struck, most Sylhetis were 
still living in all-male households, and were therefore able to move on down to London where 
jobs were still relatively plentiful, although accommodation was as scarce as it was 
expensive. So it was that when the Sylhetis finally moved towards family reunion – s they, 
too gradually acknowledged that transnational commuting had ceased to be a viable option – 
they had for the most part regrouped in the east end of London, and most especially in Tower 
Hamlets. But here the housing market was against them. The cheap terraced houses which 
their Mirpuri and Jullunduri predecessors had bought with such alacrity were not by then 
available, even in Tower Hamlets, and they were therefore left with little alternative but to 
take up tenancies in elderly and extremely run-down municipal housing blocks. Given the 
uncertain employment base on which they relied, the very large size of their households 
(particularly in the light of the accommodation available), the lateness of most their younger 
members’ arrival in Britain, their lack of familiarity with English, let alone the intense 
hostility of most of their more indigenous neighbours to their very presence, the Sylhetis of 
Tower Hamlets soon found themselves facing particularly severe levels of socio-economic 
distress. But whilst the existence of such distress was relatively easy to measure in statistical 
terms, such that the w ole community soon came to be identified as suffering from some 
particularly severe forms of racial deprivation, those who applied that categorisation were for 
the most part ill-informed about the processes of transnational entrepreneurship which had 
brought them to that pass – or of the extent to which they might begin to use those self-same  
resources to lever their way out of the holes in which they consequently found themselves.  
4 Marriage and the ongoing dynamics of kin-based networks 
Set within the context of the developmental cycle of domestic groups, and indeed of the on-
going dynamics of kin-based networks, marriage is far more than a conjugal partnership 
between two individuals: rather it lies at the core of the way in which the domestic group –
and indeed the corporate extended family – renews itself so that it can proceed onwards into 
the next generation. In the absence of an ensured process of renewal, kinship networks simply 
fall apart. Yet just why and how does marriage play such a key role? In the first place 
marriage not only ensures the legitimacy of the children of any given conjugal partnership – 
which is of course a key issue when the extended family is a property-owning corporation – 
but is also the precursor to the establishment of a stable domestic environment within which 
the children can be socialised into the group’s own specific norms and values. However to 
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fulfil that role marriage partners must also be carefully selected: if the in-marrying mother is 
unfamiliar with those norms and v lues, there is a strong likelihood that her offspring will not 
be appropriately socialised, and hence incapable of sustaining the reciprocities on which the 
network is based into the next generation.  
 
That point is well taken in most peasant societies, and most especially in South Asian: indeed 
it is one of the principal factors behind the maintenance of the rule of caste endogamy, for by 
restricting the choice of partner to ones own community, one can thereby ensure that in-
coming brides will be thoroughly familiar with the relevant norms and values, and hence able 
to socialise her offspring in an appropriate way. Moreover such commitment to endogamy is 
of particularly far reaching significance when kinship networks go transnational. If high 
levels of endogamy can be sustained, such networks have an excellent prospect of being able 
continuously reconstitute themselves. If not, networks are likely to be an evanescent 
phenomenon which run into the sands once their founders have passed away. 
 
Beyond this, it is also worth remembering that in the context of a social universe in which the 
basic operational units are patrilinially extended families, marriage also plays a further 
crucial structural role: the inter-family affinal linkages to which every marriage gives rise 
provide every family to engage in a further process of optional network-c struction – for in 
sharp contrast to the inescapable character of agnatic ties within the biraderi, such affinal 
linkages are not hereditarily pre-ordained. In other wods they open up a huge area of choice, 
and hence of opportunities for strategic negotiation. Yet just how are these opportunities 
played out? As we shall see the answers devised can vary enormously from group to group, 
and from context to context – with further far-reaching implications for the way in which 
transnational networks work.  
4.1 Jullunduri strategies and their consequences 
As we saw earlier, few Jullunduri settlers waited for much longer than a couple of years 
before reuniting their conjugal households in Britain, at which point they were still at the 
early stages of their developmental cycle. However it did not take long before their oldest 
children began to reach their late teens, with the result that they began to turn their minds to 
one of the most challenging problems facing all South Asian parents: choosing an appropriate 
riste. Not that they faced any shortage of offers. Precisely because they had established 
themselves in Britain, and because all potential in-laws could thereby expect to plug directly 
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into all the benefits open to transnational networkers, their offspring were regarded as 
extremely attractive catches on the Punjabi marriage market. Since they stood at the top of a 
buyers’ market, offers of iste were abundant: what ever position they had occupied prior to 
their departure, they were now in a position to pick and choose. But on what criteria?
 
At least at the outset, most Jullunduri parents continued to operate in terms of the routine 
conventions deployed in rural Punjab. In this context aspects of the prospective partners’ 
personal characteristics – such as their height, age, skin-colour, outlook and horoscopic data – 
were undoubtedly expected to been in broad match with one another, such considerations had 
never been the decisive factor in the decision making process. Instead considerations of status 
were invariably of far more pressing concern when it came to arranging riste. It is easy to see 
why. Since by far the most effective measure of every corporate extended family’s standing 
within the nominally egalitarian bi deri was the prestige and standing of the families into 
which they succeeded in marrying their daughters, and to a slightly lesser extent the scale and 
quality of the dowries which the family’s in-marrying brides brought with them, making the 
appropriate strategic choices with respect to their offspring’s riste had always been a key 
feature of intra-biraderi political manoeuvring, above all because it was this which ultimately 
connected each family’s material status with its position in the hierarchy of izzat. In the long 
run families with depleted material resources could never hope to keep up with families 
whom they had formerly regarded as their social inferiors, but whose new-found w alth 
enabled them to begin to make much more strategically advantageous ristes. 
 
Given that so many of the early Jullunduri transnational entrepreneurs were drawn from 
families who had for one reason or another fallen behind in the status game, they were 
particularly keen to make up lost ground in this way. Hence when it came to choosing 
spouses for their offspring, they not only conformed to all the conventional restrictions on 
marriage choice, but also took the opportunity to radically enhance their social standing by 
accepting the most prestige-generating ristes available. In doing so they rarely considered 
making matches with their fellow settlers’ offspring: after all, they tended to occupy much 
the same relative position in the status hierarchy as they did themselves. Instead they 
overwhelmingly looked back to their home base in Punjab, and ideally to families with 
extensive landholdings, or who had built up large business enterprises, or whose members 
had achieved senior positions either in the military or the civilian bureaucracy. But although 
not everyone necessarily reached the dizzy heights to which they aspired, networking through  
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ristes offered excellent opportunities for entrepreneurial reciprocity: those who had already 
established themselves overseas could much more firmly underpin their new-found position 
of prestige, whilst the recipients of those ris es could provide themselves with a ready-made 
entry-ticket into transnational space.  
 
This was underlined by the emergence of a very significant shift in patterns of post-conjugal 
residence, particularly in the case of Punjab-based grooms. The residential destination of 
Punjab-based brides in such transnational unions was quite straightforward: since they had 
always been expected to become members of their in-laws’ household, they moved to Britain 
to join their husbands at the earliest possible opportunity. But whilst the parents of grooms 
who had married British-based brides were normally equally keen that their newly acquired 
daughters-in-law should at least put in an appear nce at the home-base of the extended family 
which they had joined, few if any expected that they would become long-term mbers of 
that household. Quite the contrary: given the extent of the material advantages associated 
with a residential shift to the UK, few brides stayed for very long. Instead they moved back to 
Britain, where they were joined by their husbands as soon as the immigration formalities 
were complete. Although substantially driven by considerations of relative status, such 
marriage strategies also added several additional dimensions to the process of transnational 
networking. In the first place it provided a very straightforward means of by-passing the ever 
more stringent controls on primary immigration which the British authorities had by then 
begun to impose, and in doing so extended the migratory component of transnational 
networking was thereby extended by a further generation; secondly, and just importantly, 
since the in-marry brides and grooms were for the most part born and bred in rural Punjab, 
the ‘first generation’ of settlers, and especially the loyalties and expectations within which 
they routinely operated, was quite directly reinforced.  
 
Nevertheless as time passed it soon became quite clear that conjugal unions which had been 
constructed on this basis could all too easily run into severe problems. However logical and 
appropriate the criteria which they were using to arrange such ristes may have seemed to the 
parental generation, and however much effort parents may have put into keeping them on an 
even keel – for having set up the riste, they had an obligation as well as an interest in 
ensuring that they worked out satisfactorily – a significant proportion began to exhibit 
alarming cracks. In seeking to get to the bottom of why this tended to occur, it is worth 
emphasising that in sharp contrast to the expectations of most Euro-American observers,  
 32
remarkably few of those young people whose personal future was being determined on this 
basis had any objection in principle to the prospect of their parents’ choosing their conjugal 
partners. Even though they might have spent the greater part of their childhood in Britain, 
most young people had simultaneously been socialised into the norms of extended family 
life: in consequence they were not only well aware of their parents’ expectations, but also felt 
that they owed them an inescapable duty of obedience. Secondly and consequently, it was 
quite clear that if they wished to retain the benefits of extended family membership, whose 
emotional benefits most of them valued a great deal, they had little choice but to conform to 
the established procedures: there was no other way in which endogamous – a  hence 
socially acceptable – marriages could be arrived at. Last but not least they had no reason to
doubt the depth of their parents’ concern for their future happiness, or that by taking such 
decisions themselves, they removed a substantial burden of responsibility from their 
children’s young and necessarily inexperienced shoulders.  
 
This is no place to discuss the merits and demerits of the practice of arranged marriage per s, 
other to note – as its proponents routinely emphasise – that it appears to offer a very effective 
prophylactic to the sky-high levels of marital breakdown currently found thr ughout the 
Euro-American world. That said, it soon became apparent that a significant minority of these 
transnational matches had begun to run into serious difficulty, not so much because they had 
been arranged, but because they had been badly arranged. It goes without saying that 
choosing a partner on behalf of someone else is an even more onerous burden than doing so 
on one’s own behalf, and that one can as easily make a serious mistake in either case. 
However the prospect of parents making an ill-informed decision in this context were 
particularly severe, for even though their British born offspring may still have been 
thoroughly at home with Punjabi behavioural and moral conventions – such that they had no 
substantial objection to an arranged marriage – the efforts which members of the older 
generation put into making an appropriate choice were often undermined because their failure 
to take sufficient cognisance of the extent to which the more non-domestic aspects of their 
British-born children’s upbringing had begun to transform so many aspects of their personal 
lifestyles. Because they were so much more skilled in cultural navigation than were their 
parents, members of the upcoming generation felt wholly at ease within a wide range of 
cultural contexts – including those which were broadly English in character. Hence the 
personal styles and values which they deployed when they stepped beyond the immediate 
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purview of the older generation often differed very radically from anything with which their 
parents – let alone their newly acquired spouses from Punjab – were at all familiar.   
 
The implications of these disjunctions differed by gender. Where a young man who had been 
brought up in Britain found that he had been provided with what he felt was a goos  of a wife 
from Punjab, there was a relatively easy way out. Relying on established Punjabi conventions 
of gender, it was easy for such young men to leave their newly acquired appendages at home, 
and to go out and enjoy themselves with their friends – pe haps even girlfriends – before 
returning home late in the evening. However frustrated their wives might be by such 
behaviour there was very little they could do about it – until or unless the dread day arrived 
when they failed to come home at all. By contrast the immediate outcome tended to be a good 
deal more severe – and certainly a great deal more explosive – in th inverse context. 
Husbands who had recently arrived from rural Punjab could easily find his confidence – and 
even his vision of his own manhood – was severely undermined when faced with the fact that 
his wife was much more attuned to English ways, and thus far more at ease in English 
contexts than he was himself. In such circumstances a couple whose relationship was 
developing perfectly wellin Punjabi contexts could easily find themselves confronted by vast 
rifts the moment they stepped out into cultural and social territory with which the husband 
was not familiar. Some husbands saw the problem coming, and wised up fast. Others were 
not so quick or so flexible, and in that case it was all too easy for them to become intensely 
jealous of  their wives’ superior linguistic and cultural competence, especially if the position 
of autonomy which they expected to occupy was further undermined as a result of finding 
themselves trapped in a position of humiliating dependency as ghar jouain (resident sons-i -
law) in their in-laws households. The resultant contradictions precipitated a huge range of 
unhappy outcomes, such that clinical depression and/or severe omestic violence was often a 
precursor to comprehensive marital breakdown.  
 
As problems of this kind became both more frequent and more overt, many members of the 
younger generation became steadily more critical of their parents’ established strategies when 
it came to choosing ristes. Two major lines of argument were advanced. Firstly that their 
parents failing to take sufficient cognisance of their children’s personal priorities, and of the 
extent to which their British experiences had conditioned their personal outlooks; and 
secondly that by restricting their search to the Punjab, a far more attractive pool of potential 
partners – the offspring of other Jullunduri settlers in Britain – was being unnecessarily 
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overlooked. Whilst many parents initially resisted those arguments, partly because they felt 
that they represented an unacceptable challenge to their authority, and partly because they 
feared that British-raised sons and daughters-in-law might prove to be a great deal more 
unruly than those raised in Punjab, it did not take long before there was a general change of 
mood. There was no immediate cost in doing so, since no matter how many attractive offers 
of riste they continued to receive from Punjab, they were under no obligation to respond 
positively to any of them. Meanwhile the scale of the Jullunduri settlement in Britain had by 
then grown to such a size that there were plentiful opportunities to continue to play the status 
game to which they had been so avidly committed in Punjab on a wholly local basis. Hence it 
did not take long before Britain – nd beyond the entire scope of the Jullunduri global 
diaspora – became the primary arena of choice, and it was only when parents were wholly 
unable to find a suitable match for their offspring within that arena that they began seriously 
to consider offers of ristefrom Punjab.  
 
As this occurred, the criteria of choice also began to undergo a steady transformation. Whilst 
the rules of caste endogamy and descent-group exogamy are still for the most part obeyed, 
the extent of potential ristedar’s landholdings back in Punjab began to be of less and less 
significance, to be replaced by an equally careful examination of the their business and 
professional achievements overseas. Allied to this the educational achievements of potential 
spouses, and most especially their prospects of building a professional future for themselves  
has also now become vital measure of the worth of every potential ristein what has now 
become a fiercely competitive marriage market. Educational qualifications are therefore 
crucial: without having gained an undergraduate degree, preferably in Medicine, Science, 
Economics or Law, preferably acquired in one of the more prestigious civic University rather 
than in one of the recently promoted ex-Polytechnics, families cannot expect to receive really 
attractive offers of riste for their sons. By the same token parents seeking to find such 
husbands for their daughters cannot hope for their offers to be taken seriously unless their 
daughters have also acquired broadly similar qualifications. 
 
It is also worth noting that there is a further sub-text to these processes, for what really 
matters is not so much that parents should themselves arrange such marriages – although they 
are invariably ready and willing to do so should that be necessary – but that matches with an 
appropriate format should give every appearance of being arranged. Hence whilst back-
channel negotiations between young people themselves have often been commonplace, an 
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ever-increasing number of Jullunduri marriages are a product of personal courtship, whose 
roots are subsequently presented as being far more traditionally grounded than was in fact the 
case. That said, most young overseas-raised Jullunduris are far from oblivious of the potential 
advantages which accrue from the transnational networks of which they are a part, and the 
further benefits which can be gained from their strategic exploitation. Hence besides retaining 
a strongly instrumentalist outlook in their approach to their personal affairs, such that they 
frequently deliberately look out for partners who are likely to be in a position to aid ands abet 
their future career plans, the marriage market (and the networks) within which the most 
successful of them now operate is now explicitly global in character. However to those with 
internationally bankable educational qualifications, the maintenance of connections with 
Punjab itself is of little significance. What is emerging instead is an increasingly dense set of 
linkages, many of which are articulated through marriage rather than through descent, 
between materially successful Punjabi families who have established themselves in Britain, 
Hong-Kong, Singapore, Kenya, Vancouver and California (for example). Not only do they all 
share broadly similar lifestyles, but they also operate within a broadly similar educational and 
professional technoscape; and although these still strongly caste-specific networks have by 
now moved very largely offshore, the reciprocities of kinship which underpin them are 
proving to be a highly effective means of sustaining a series of linkages which enable 
information, ideas, capital and of course the members of the network itself to move 
strategically around in transnational space to their own advantage. At present these linkages 
appear to be promoting a very substantial flow of highly educated young Jullunduris who 
have been born and raised in Britain to the much more open, as well as substantially better 
paid, employment market in Canada and the United States.   
4.2 Mirpuri strategies and their consequences 
In sharp contrast to the Jullunduris, most of the first generation of British-resident Mirpuris 
were finally joined by their wives and daughters at a much later stage in their domestic 
group’s process of development: indeed by the time that that occurred, many parents had 
already arranged their eldest children’s marriages, and hence were deeply involved in 
strategic manoeuvres with respect to the placement of their as yet unmarried children’s future 
ristes. Given that they also made those decisions within the context of a very differently 
constituted set of marriage rules, it is hardly surprising that the dynamics of transnational 
network construction in which they subsequently engaged turned out to follow a very 
different trajectory from the one we have just considered.  
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That is not to suggest, however, that marriage rules and their implications were the only 
issues at stake. Given that its local economy was so much more ill-developed than that of 
Jullundur, and that the opportunities for socio-econ mic advancement back home were even 
more tightly circumscribed, the ‘pressure to migrate’ (as the Immigration Authorities chose to 
describe it) from Mirpur was indeed substantially greater than from nearby Jullundur. Just as 
significantly, a further consequence of Mirpuri settlers much delayed switch to family 
reunion was that when were at long last ready to begin arranging their offspring’s marriages 
on a transnational basis, Britain’s immigration laws had become a great deal more draconian. 
By then marriage to a British passport holding spouse was one of the few remaining ways in 
which potential migrants from South Asia could still legitimately enter the UK. In the face of 
these pressure it is hardly surprising that frequency with which marriages were arranged 
between the British passport-holding offspring of British-based settlers and Mirpur based 
spouses soon began to soar. However in their case there was no subsequent decline in this 
inflow: well over half of young British-based Mirpuris still contract such marriages – almost
always with their cousins. As a result the transnational networks within British Mirpuris 
operate exhibit a radically different structure from those which their Jullunduri counterparts 
have built around themselves. 
 
Yet before going on to consider either the nature or the consequences of these differences, we 
must first subject the reasons as to just why the Mirpuris have continued to behave in this 
way to close analytical examination, for even though their distinctive marriage rules may 
indeed lie at heart of any such explanation, any suggestion that the Mirpuris have continued 
to behave in this way because they were mindlessly following a wholly deterministic set of 
customs, such that they were quite literally incapable of behaving in any other way is wholly 
insupportable. Mirpuris were and are no more ‘slaves to custom’ than the Jullunduris. Quite 
the contrary. Their behaviour – particularly in the context of transnational network 
construction – is just as strategically driven is that of any other group; and no more and no 
less than anyone else, they have drawn creatively on the resources of their own specific 
cultural capital to pursue their own equally self-determined goals as theyventured out, 
equally firmly from below, into transnational space. And to the extent that kinship was a key 
component of the networks of reciprocity which they constructed in order to facilitate that 
enterprise, the specific characteristics of their kinship system inevitably had a far reaching 
impact on the precise ways in which they set about doing so, and on the ways in which those 
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networks subsequently operated. It could not be otherwise. Hence there is no need to 
establish that their long-standing preference for close-kin marriage would make a difference. 
What is anything but self-evident, however, is the precise way in which members of kinship 
networks which were so structured, as well as the patterns of inter-personal relationships 
which were generated in that context would affect – and in turn be affected by – a large scale 
move into transnational entrepreneurship. Exploring these issues provide us with yet another 
opportunity to examine the range of ways in which transnational networks work. 
 
Although Mirpuri parents plan their children’s ristes just as strategically as do their  
Jullunduri counterparts, they do so with a rather different set of considerations in mind.  In 
the first place the drive to improve one’s own extended family’s status viz-a-viz its 
immediate agnatic rivals is far less significant: indeed the issue cannot, by definition, arise 
when bilateral cousin marriage is the norm. Secondly where that is indeed the case, marriage 
does not give rise to – or permit the strategic manipulation of – an individuating network of 
alliances with members of socially distant descent groups: rather both agnatic and affinal ties 
are confined with a relatively small compass, and very frequently overlap. This certainly does 
not mean that both types of relationship are not open to strategic manipulation: quite the 
contrary the choice of exactly where to place one’s available ristes offers endless 
opportunities to reinforce, to confound and/or to undermine such strategic linkages.  
 
With this in mind it makes sense to suggest that one of the most driving forces behind the 
operation of Mirpuri kinship networks is the opportunities which they offer for the exercise of 
personal power, and that these considerations tend to be particularly salient when it comes to 
arranging ristes. Moreover in the case of women, such power is rarely rooted in authority, 
since formal authority is overwhelmingly ascribed to men. How, then, do women gain access 
to power? Above all by making the most of the relationships through which persons are 
obligated to them, be it their filial ties with their sons and daughters, the alliances which they 
are able to construct (and the debts of gratitude which they are able to incur) with their own 
siblings’ sons and daughters, and/or the subservience that they are in a position to extract 
from their own daughters-in-law. Such manoeuvres are by no means unique to women, of 
course. Men also participate in such manoeuvres, although they tend to play the game in a 
much less subtle way, not least because they can always fall back on their authority in order 
to trump all such calculations. Be that as it may, once such processes of inter-p rsonal 
manoeuvring are set in train, no-o e can afford to ignore them. In the face of efforts by more 
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powerful members of the biraderi to strategically advance their interests, it is only to be 
expected that everyone else will start to do the same, if only to protect their own interests and 
concerns; and just as in the wider transnational arena through which the biraderi as a whole is 
seeking to manoeuvre to its own advantage, those with limited power often have little 
opportunity to bide their time until niches of opportunity begin to open up, and then to make 
deft use of their limited assets in an effort to make the most of them. Ne working skills are as 
vital a component of success in domestic contexts as they are in the process of making the 
most of transnational space – nd no-where do the dynamics of these two processes link up 
more comprehensively than with respect to the issue of mate selection. 
 
Although the marriage of young people holding British passports with their Mirpur-based 
cousins was undoubtedly an excellent way in which each biraderi’s could facilitate its 
collective interest maximising the scale of its foothold in Britain, it would nevertheless be 
quite idle to suggest this pattern of riste distribution was the deliberate outcome of collective 
planning.  A better view is that all this was the outcomes of a multi-dimensional process of 
decision making, and that although the very substantial additional material opportunities 
available in transnational space undoubtedly tipped the playing field very firmly in a British 
direction, it in no sense inhibited the operation of the game itself. 
 
In the first place those who were responsible for establishing these transnational ristes ( nd 
not infrequently the actual spouses themselves) already had close emotional ties between 
themselves, which were not infrequently reinforced by a longstanding informal agreement 
that their offspring should be brought together once the time was ripe. Secondly those had not 
yet made the transnational leap took it for granted that those of their siblings who had 
managed to make the passage to Britain were under an obligation to share their good fortune, 
and that a failure to fulfil that duty repudiated the values of kinship itself. Thirdly those on 
the receiving end of those pressures were by no means averse to making a positive response, 
since those whom they favoured with their children’s ristes could thereby be placed under a 
debt of gratitude, which was best repaid through loyalty to their sponsor. In other words it 
became yet another route by which personal power within the extended family could be 
strategically enhanced. This was yet furth r underlined by the fact that most parents of British 
passport holding offspring had an extensive degree of choice with whom amongst their 
relatives was to be favoured with their choice: a decision had to be taken as to whether the 
riste was to go to a member of the husband’s, or of his wife’s, immediate birad r, nd 
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beyond that as to which of the available sibling’s children was to be chosen; and given that 
the commitment to cooperation within most b raderis are matched by interpersonal feuds and 
conflicts which constantly threaten to undermine its unity, the negotiations – a d the deals – 
associated with these processes were, and still are, complex in the extreme.  
 
Yet although the underlying skew in the playing field, let alone the fact that the number of 
young Mirpuris reaching marriageable age was rising steadily, so precipitating an ever-
escalating transnational inflow of both brides and bridegrooms, and although these unions 
were also susceptible to much the same kinds of inter-personal tension as those which we 
previously explored in a Jullunduri context, there outcomes in this case were very different. 
The first point to be noted is that when a union is established between two cousins, and when 
there have also been a several other conjugal exchanges between the two sibling groups, 
comprehensive marital breakdown has far reaching implications: not only is one thereby 
crossing ones aunts and one’s uncles as well as one parents, but the knock-on effects of such 
a breakdown may also put such pressure on other parallel unions that they, too, collapse. In 
other words no matter how poor the underlying conjugal relationship may be, the couple are 
under particularly intense pressure to keep up appearances. Secondly and just as importantly, 
young Mirpuris who were doubtful of their parents’ priorities in selecting rist  found it much 
more difficult to persuade them to change their minds, since the older generation could and 
did argue that the had a duty to give priority to their kinsfolk’s offers of riste: in no way was 
it a matter of open choice. Thirdly Mirpuri parents displayed a mark tendency to regard such 
suggestions as offering an unwelcome – and no doubt Western-inspired – threat to their 
personal power, and to take the view that such potential rebellio s were best nipped in the 
bud. Hence they displayed a mark preference for formalising their children’s ristesas soo  
after the age of sixteen as possible. Not only were children of that age much less well placed 
to challenge their parents’ authority, but there was also an excellent prospect that if one 
provided teenagers who had previously been subjected to some strict rules of gender 
segregation with an opportunity to engage in sexual activities on a wholly legitimate basis, 
there was an excellent prospect that their natural passions would get their relationship off to a 
good start. Moreover if pregnancy should result from their activities, there was an equally 
strong prospect that the responsibilities of parenthood would tie them down even more firmly 
within the biraderi network. 
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In comparative terms, one crucial additional point emerges from all this. In the Jullunduri 
case, potential spouses educational achievements quickly became crucial components in the 
calculus of riste construction; and since t soon became self evident to parents, no less than to 
the young people themselves, that educational qualifications were the s ne qua non of making 
the attractive matches, all young people came under particularly strong pressure to press their 
way upwards through the educational system. But whilst most Mirpuris were at least in 
principle as keen that their offspring should become doctors and lawyers as their Jullunduri 
counterparts, many fewer have as yet seen those dreams implemented. In the first place 
Mirpuri parents’ own lack of education (given that educational resources have long been very 
much more sparse in Mirpur than Jullundur) meant that they were largely unfamiliar with the 
practical modalities of educational success. Secondly, and just as importantly, ince marriage 
negations were primarily driven by strategic manoeuvres within the biraderi, the educational 
qualifications and potential job prospects of the prospective spouses were normally viewed as 
being only of marginal significance. Hence not only have many fewer Mirpuri children as yet 
made the spectacular educational breakthroughs which were commonplace amongst their 
Jullunduri counterparts even in the early days of settlement, but to the extent that Mirpuri 
kinship networks are very much ore circumscribed that than those established by the 
Jullunduris, even those few successes have had much less of a ripple effect than occurred 
amongst the latter. Hence even if one is careful to control for the stage in its developmental 
process which thecommunity as a whole has so far reached, there can be little doubt that the 
younger generation of British-ba ed Mirpuris have not been nearly so educationally and 
occupationally successful than their Jullunduri counterparts. 
 
Nor, in consequence, have Mirpuri affinal networks gone anything like as comprehensively 
‘offshore’ as those amongst their Jullunduri counterparts. Given that the Mirpuri diaspora is 
much less global in character, such that its members have as yet established no significant 
toeholds on the far side of the Atlantic, they still largely operate within a much more spatially 
restricted arena. Yet more important still, since their networks loop endlessly back to the 
biraderis’ home bases in Mirpur, the escalators which they have so far established work 
much more effectively as a means of transporting personnel from the periphery to the 
metropolis than they do as a means of facilitating movement upwards and outwards through 
the metropolitan socio-e onomic order. But if the Mirpuris’ achievements consequently 
appear unimpressive in the extreme when measured in terms of conventional metropolitan 
yardsticks (e.g. Berthaud 1998, Modood et al 1997), they are very much more substantial 
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when viewed from a transnationalist perspective. In straightforward demog aphic terms, the 
sheer scale on which Mirpuris are continuing move from the periphery to the core is very 
striking indeed: ristes alone are currently generating an inflow of around 10,000 spouses per 
annum – figure which is probably closely matched by the number of British-ba ed 
Jullunduris who move across the Atlantic to seek their fortunes in North America. But if the 
Jullunduris’ search for enhanced prestige has led to them to invest heavily in the acquisition 
of educational and professional assets, which has in turn led them to build networks which 
facilitated the movement of their human capital ever further offshore, the Mirpuris on-going 
commitment to inward movement of human capital to the UK is matched by an equally 
strong proclivity to invest their financial capital back home: my current investigations suggest 
that British Mirpuris currently remit somewhere between £200 million and £300 million to 
Pakistan each year. However the opportunities for productive investment remain as limited as 
ever, with the greater part of this enormous cash flow goes into the construction of 
spectacular private residences, which are designed not so much for living, but rather to make 
a very public indication not just of one’s achievements, but of the extent to which those
outshine those of one’s immediate kinsmen. As is to be expected the most avid players of this 
game are those who were born and brought up in Mirpur, and for whom such constructions 
provide a very effective means of publicly celebrating a life of achievement.  
 
At the same time a number of powerful counter-curre s have also begun to emerge – at least 
some of which are artefacts of the responses which parents have been driven to adopt in 
response to the increasingly strict requirements of the immigration of authorities. One of the 
most significant of these is that the sponsor (whom the British authorities routinely identify as 
the spouse, rather than his or her extended family) can support the incoming partner ‘without 
recourse to public funds’. Hence if their daughters are to gain permission for their husbands 
to join them, they need to have spent a significant period in period in paid employment, and 
also that they have acquired suitable accommodation in which to live. In the face of such 
pressures the long-standing expectation that young women should not take paid employment 
outside the household has by now been largely swept away, such that established patterns of 
gender relations are now coming under ever more serious pressure. What impact all this will 
have on patterns of interpersonal relations within the extended family, and beyond that on the 
current popularity of transcontinental marriages with Mirpur-based co sins remains to be 
seen.  
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4.3 Sylheti strategies and their consequences 
Given that the Sylhetis took so much longer to bring their wives and children to Britain, few 
parents found themselves confronted with the issue of when and where to arrange their 
British passport holding children’s marriages until the early 1990s. However given the 
sharpness of the gender hierarchy in terms of which they routinely operated, the fact that 
husbands were on average fifteen years older than their wives, and that most of them also 
took the view that there was a strong prospect that young girls would swiftly run ff the rails
– particularly in a British context – if they were not married as soon as possible after they had 
passed puberty, most Sylheti fathers regarded the arrangement of their daughters’ marriages 
as an urgent priority. What, though, would govern their choices? 
 
In common with almost all other South Asian settlers their initial reaction was to look back 
home for potential sons-in-law. But whilst their basic marriage rules were closely akin to 
those of the Mirpuris, such that they regarded cousin marriage as wholly permissible, their 
actual preferences were very different, since they did not share the Mirpuri assumption that 
siblings had a right of first refusal when it came to arranging each others’ children’s 
marriages. Instead they tended much more towards the Jullunduri view – that marriages 
which enabled one to establish affinal ties with well-connected in-laws were an excellent way 
in which those who had made substantial economic progress could advance, and indeed 
cement, their extended family’s position in the local status hierarchy. As Gardner (1995) 
shows, the marriages of members of better off families back in Sylhet – ma y of whom had 
achieved that position as a result of their transnational connections – were very much more 
likely to marry at a substantial distance from their home base even before the process of 
family reunion had begun to take off on any scale. Hence it was hardly surprising that when 
fathers returned to Sylhet to arrange marriages for their British-based offspring, most t ok 
advantage of their ready-made opportunity to break their way yet further into the upper 
echelons of the social hierarchy. The incentives for doing so were strong. Relatively poor 
families were thereby able make highly prestigious connections, and even if they had o ly 
managed to establish the most moderate of footholds in Britain, their bargaining power had 
become so great that they were able to make substantial financial demands on potential in-
laws before agreeing to any given match. That not only led t  a substantial inflation in dowry 
payments, of which land tended to become an increasingly significant component, but also to 
a comprehensive reversal of the normal flow of prestations as far as their daughters’ 
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marriages were concerned, such that the groom’s parents were also required to offer a 
substantial ‘dowry’ – which once again frequently took the form of assets in land – before  
the match was allowed to proceed. Needless to say these dowry payments in land were of 
little significance to the spouses themselves, since they invariably took up residence in 
Britain at the earliest possible opportunity. The acquisition of additional property in land only 
made much sense within the context of a parental – and above all a paternal – agenda.  
 
Just how long this pattern will continue is hard to tell. Given that many members of the older 
generation are still firmly wedded to the acquisition of property in land, to protecting their 
daughters’ honour, and to the maintenance of at least an appearance of absolute personal 
authority within the household, the tendency to maintain this pattern of preferences will 
undoubtedly remain strong. However in sharp contrast to their Mirpuri counterparts, if they 
were to respond to pressure from their British-raised c ildren to delay the age at which their 
marriages are arranged, and above all to consider the possibility of setting up those 
relationships on a more local rather than a transnational basis, Sylheti parents would not risk 
the ire of their kinsfolk back home, since there is no expectation that they should have 
preferential treatment in such contexts. As yet it is still too early to tell, since such marriages 
have only begun to be arranged with any frequency during the course of the past decade. 
However my own expectation – for what it is worth – is that return marriages to Sylhet will 
become steadily less frequent in the years to come, and that in that sense, at least, they will 
much more closely emulate the Jullunduris than the Mirpuris.  
 
But before bringing the wole of this discussion to a conclusion, one further point is worth 
mentioning: the distinctive trajectory which the Sylhetis are beginning to trace through both 
the employment market and the educational system. I shall be very brief. Whilst the Sylhetis 
were extremely badly hurt by the recession in heavy engineering an textiles in the early 
1980s, so that many who had hitherto been employed in the Midlands and the North moved 
down to London, largely to take up jobs in clothing manufacturing, during the last five years 
employment in that sector has also largely disappeared. Luckily, however, Sylhetis have been 
immensely successful in open up a new employment niche in the restaurant and take-away 
trade. 
 
‘Indian’ restaurants, most of which were run and staffed by Sylheti settlers, began to appear 
in Britain in the mid nineteen fifties, and since then have enjoyed an exponential pattern of 
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growth. Chicken tikka marsala, a dish unheard of in India, let alone in Sylhet, has of become 
England’s favourite fast foods, and Restaurants and Take-aways aimed at satisfying the huge 
popular demand for curries can now be found even in the smallest of towns. With a turnover 
of several £billion a year, substantial profits are being made in the trade, which is also a vital 
source of employment: over 60% of Bengali men aged between 20 and 30 are currently 
employed in the catering trade. This could, of course, prove to be a dead end: although 
catering undoubtedly provides a means of survival, the hours are long, and most of the profits
go to the owners – who are most usually members of the older generation. Nevertheless it 
worth remembering that the section of Britain’s minority population whose younger members 
have achieved by far the most rapid degree of upward mobility – the Chinese – also initially 
colonised exactly the same niche. 
 
In this respect the academic achievements of the current crop of young Sylhetis are very 
striking. Despite many handicaps, including the recentness of their arrival in Britain, their 
parents poverty and lack of education, and their concentration in often ill-resourced inner-city 
schools, Bengali children – the vast majority of whom are of Sylheti parentage – are not only 
proving to be remarkably successful at school, but the girls are beginning to significa tly 
outperform the boys. To be sure the current performance of Bengali children may still only be 
marginally ahead of their Pakistani counterparts, and good deal less spectacular than those of 
the Indians. However the moment one factors in the length of time which as passed since 
family reunion took place, it becomes quite clear that the upward curve being followed by 
Sylheti children, and most especially by Sylheti girls, may well prove to be closely congruent 
with those followed by the Jullunduris. Q ite apart from the patterns of upward mobility 
through the employment market which such educational success is likely to precipitate, it can 
also be expected to have a far reaching impact on marriage strategies.  
 
In the first place young people who are educational successful are well placed to argue that 
their marriage should be delayed until their education is complete – not least because they 
can very plausibly insist that they are much more likely to be able to catch a prestigious 
spouse when they are fully qualified as a doctor, a lawyer, and so forth. Moreover once they 
are professionally qualified, they are also much better placed to insist that they should make 
such choices themselves. But whom will they choose? Current developments suggest that 
whilst most well-qualified young Sylheti women would much prefer to marry husbands of a 
similar background to themselves, suitable matches are extremely hard to find, especially 
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since the relatively small number of well qualified young Bengali men are not only mo
prepared than they to leave the matter in their parents hands, but also prefer – other things 
being equal – to marry spouses who are significantly less well qualified than they are 
themselves.  
5 Conclusion 
It will by now be self- vident that Jullunduri, Mirpuri and Sylheti networks – and by 
extension those which have been constructed by members of all the other many components 
of the South Asian presence in Britain – are currently developing in radically differing ways. 
Nevertheless they share many commonalities. Each is a specific example of entrepreneurship 
from below, and each has enabled a substantial number of people from relatively peripheral 
regions in the Indian subcontinent to break their way into metropolitan Britain, and to take 
advantage of the radically superior material opportunities available in that context. Moreover 
if one returns to the questions about how transnational networks work with which we began, 
it is quite clear that in this context, at least, it is above all through the principles and practice 
of kinship reciprocity that translocal networks of trust and solidarity have been constructed 
and maintained, and through which structures of social closure which guarantee loyalty and 
curtail malfeasance have been sustained, no matter how great the degree of spatial separation 
between network members may now be. We are also in a position to answer a further 
question posed by Smith and Guarnizo: namely as to  
“whether transnational practices and relations are merely an evanescent phenomenon, 
which will not last beyond first generation migrants. Or, by contrast, are transnational 
social practices becoming an enduring characteristic of global social organisation?” 
(ibid: 15 – 16) 
At least in a South Asian context – and the same may wellapply elsewhere – group 
endogamy appears to be a key feature in the long-term maintenance of transnational 
networks. Hence as long as conventions of endogamy continue to be adhered to, and the 
figure for almost all of Britain’s South Asian communities rarely fall below 80%, there is a 
strong probability that such networks will be sustained. But however sound this conclusion 
may be, we should take care before making any assumptions about the direction in which 
causality flows: in all the situations which have been considered here, it is the perceived 
benefits of network membership, rather than mere custom, which has underpinned continuing 
high rates of endogamy.  
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Beyond this, however, generalisation becomes an increasingly difficult task. That 
transnational networks interact with local power structures of class, gender, race and caste 
wherever they touch ground is plain to see – n t l ast because transnational networks affect 
those very structures as much as they are affected by them. However because the dynamics of 
all these processes are so often grounded in the specificities of the kinship system within 
which each group operates, there is nothing that is routine or regular about the trajectory 
which each such working network begins to follow over the longer term. Whilst careful 
analysis may enable us to gain a post-hoc understanding of just what has recently been going 
on, the extent to which each group’s precise trajectory of adaptation has emerged in response 
to a huge mass of largely unforeseeable conting n ies renders all future predictions 
intrinsically unreliable.  
 
What is undeniable, however, is that most of the current crop of transnational networks do 
indeed work, at least in the sense that they bring benefits of some kind to all their members. 
What is equally clear is that the most crucial asset in the hands of entrepreneurs from below 
is their own cultural capital, much (although by no means all) of which is embedded in their 
kinship system. However this is not to advance a ‘culturalist’ argument in any straightforward 
sense, for in no way am I suggesting that cultural capital does determines behaviour. On the 
contrary it is much better understood as a complex set of ideas and possibilities, located quite 
as much at a collective as an individual level, which network members are in a position to 
draw upon to plot their way forward on their own terms, and which enables them creatively 
to circumvent the obstacles which obstruct their chosen path. Moreover precisely because 
those involved are engaged in ntrepreneurship from below, their very alterity is a crucial 
dimension of their capacity for agency: it is precisely because of their capacity to act and to 
organise themselves in unexpected ways (at least from the perspective of the hegemonic 
majority) that has enabled them – and indeed continues to enable them – to succeed, despite 
the odds piled up against them. 
 
Yet just how unique are these processes? In the first place it is worth noting that such 
strategies are no less relevant to those who have reached much more exalted positions in the 
global economy. Similarly structured networks which are if anything even more global in 
character by highly qualified people of South Asian, Chinese and Japanese descent, and in 
each case it is highly personalised ties of descent, of quasi-kin hip and above all of marriage 
invariably holds the edifice together. Only time will tell as to whether such strategies will 
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enable  those involved to beat the more formally structured Euro-American transnational 
corporations which currently bestride the world at their own game. Nor is that the end of the 
story. Whilst the escalators which now stretch from a few selected locations far out on the 
periphery into the hearts of most metropolitan cities may provide some of the most 
spectacular examples of transnational entrepreneurship, similar networks are also emerging 
along all manner of other vectors. Some are still explicitly transnational, such as those which 
lead to the oil-rich states of the Middle East; others, such as those that lead to Shanghai, 
Dhaka, Bombay, Delhi, Karachi and Cairo may nominally be translocal, since those involved 
have not crossed a national boundary to reach their destination. But whatever the situation 
within which such developments occur, it would be most unwise to assume that extended 
kinship reciprocities – and the potential which they offer for building and maintaining trans-
local networks – will necessarily prove to be anything like so fragile as they have turned out 
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